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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
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Wardley Better Homes and Garden, 
Respondent, 
v. 
Leland Mascaro, Sheri Mascaro, 
Tracy Cannon and Cannon Associates, 






This matter is before the court upon a Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari, filed pursuant to Rule 48, of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Petition for Writ of Certiorari 
filed on March 19, 2001, by petitioner is granted. 
FOR THE COURT: 
/Zug. 1, aoof 
Date 
Richard C. Howe 
Chief Justice 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on August 9, 2001, a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing ORDER was deposited in the United States mail to 
the parties listed below: 
STEVEN B. SMITH 
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SALT LAKE CITY UT 84111 
MARK O. MORRIS 
DAVID N. WOLF 
SNELL & WILMER 
15 W S TEMPLE #1200 
GATEWAY TOWER W 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84101 
and a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER was hand 
delivered to a personal representative of the courts listed 
below: 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE 
ATTN: SUZY CARLSON 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 1860 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-1860 
PAULETTE STAGG 
COURT OF APPEALS 
450 S STATE ST 
PO BOX 140230 
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84114-0230 
Deputy Clerk 
Case No. 20010245-SC 
THIRD DISTRICT, SALT LAKE , 940907000 
Tab 2 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI 
MASCARO, and TRACEY CANNON, 
Defendants. 




WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and 
SHERI MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and 
ARLES HANSEN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
COURT'S RULING 
CASE NO. 940907000 
A Notice to Submit having been filed, pursuant to Rule 4-501, 
Code of Judicial Administration, in connection with defendant 
Tracey Cannon's Motion for Summary Judgment and plaintiff's Motion 
WARDLEY V. MASCARO PAGE TWO COURT'S RULING 
for Leave to File Amended Complaint, the Court having reviewed the 
Motions, Memoranda in Support and Reply Memorandum and the 
Memoranda in Opposition, and the Court being fully advised and 
finding good cause, rules as stated herein. 
The Motion For Summary Judgment was filed first and is 
therefore considered first by this Court. The Motion for Summary 
Judgment is denied because there are material facts at issue, 
including what defendant, Cannon, knew or should have known and 
when she obtained any knowledge she had, etc. 
The Motion to Amend Complaint is granted. It should be noted 
that this Court is not ruling^ on the viability of any of 
plaintiff's new claims. Plaintiff is urged to very carefully 
assess the facts and law and only file those claims that can be 
brought in good faith after a diligent exploration of the facts. 
Plaintiff has ten days from the date of this Ruling to file 
the Amended Complaint and an Order consistent with this Ruling. 
Dated this H ^ day of October, 1996. 
jd 
LESLIE A. LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Court's Ruling, to the following, this / -^ day of 
October, 1996: 
J. Craig Smith 
NIELSEN & SENIOR 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
60 East South Temple, Suite 1100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark O. Morris 
SNELL Sc WILMER 
Attorney for Defendant Cannon 
111 East Broadway, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Steven W. Dougherty 
ANDERSON Sc KARRENBERG 
Attorney for Defendant Mascaro 
50 West Broadway, Suite 700 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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AUG 2 8 1998 
SALT LA^COUNTY 
/ / Deputy Clerk 
WARDLEY 
Plaintiff 
BETTER HOMES fi GARDENS, 
v s . 
LELAND J . MASCARO, 
D e f e n d a n t s . 
i t a l 
LELAND J . MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
C o u n t e r c l a i m a n t s , 
vs. 
WARDLEY 
BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Counterdefendant. 
LELAND J- MASCARO and SHERI 
MASCARO, 
Third Party Plaintiffs, 
VS. 
BOT„ ^ * » — ^
s WNSEB
' 
Third Party Defendants. = 
MEMORANDUM DECISION 
CASE NO. 940907000 
b £ore the court for trial beginning on JUne 8, 
T h i s c a s e ca^e before th 
1998. and continuing through June 11. • 
WARDLEY V. MASCARO PAGE TWO MEMORANDUM DECISION 
received testimony and heard argument from counsel, ruled from the 
bench that the plaintiffs had not established a cause of action 
against defendant Tracy Cannon with respect to their claim that 
defendant Tracy Cannon's conduct violated the Utah Administrative 
Code. Specifically, the Court found that defendant Tracy Cannon's 
conduct was not unprofessional or unethical under the totality of 
the facts and circumstances and based upon the testimony of certain 
witnesses, including defendant Tracy Cannon and Rodney "Butch" 
Dailey, whom the Court found to be credible. The Court also ruled 
that the plaintiffs had not met their burden of proof in connection 
with their claim that defendant Tracy Cannon intentionally 
interfered with the plaintiff's prospective economic relations with 
respect to the Wetcor/Michael Ahlin deal, the Michael 
Brodsky/Hamlet Development deal and the Boulder deal (see factual 
discussion below). Further, the Court ruled that the plaintiffs 
had not met their burden of proof as to their claim that defendant 
Cannon's failure to remit the commissions on the sale of the 
defendant Mascaros' property to the plaintiff constituted 
conversion. The remaining issues raised in the Second Amended 
Complaint, the Counterclaim, and the Third Party Complaint were 
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taken under advisement by the Court ^ r ft irther, morp "in -depth 
EAC1UM, BACKGROUND 
T h i s Court, f i n d s that c r e d i b l e t , jt :m ;r; a<rr.i< 
. • -:a» ' . ] : ; • r loilowine fact? 'ascaros ("Mascaros") 
defendants and third-parly p^^iii: id:,, wei . fii'.t .• j.la. M d , 
1:1 :i i rd-party defendant- Aries Hansen ("Mr, Hansen7') in M «" summei ui 
1993. Mr Hansen, u.. ;*vpni: « = ••; . i - ' ' '.o rc-nt -s : the 
plaintiff and counterdefendant Wardley Better Home: hardens 
1
 .,,J:^«^ %* xaros were infpfpqtpp j r, 
selling approximately l^ H ar»o: «;i i^al property wt 
.'
 r- • Hansen informed the Nasrai >s that he-
was lookin-'i fo: property i: tua*- area f, . r . cna* 
.• ;. President ^f Impact Development Corporation <tM » Wetcor. 
Af ter his ,>. * - , .. . me* • I i i I I > .i i < • sen met 
with defendant and third-party plaintlM oheri Mascdn / M^r c 
Mascaro") at ;
 t . . . " * ^  n ~
4oreeir' n* -1 * ' 
M a s c a r o s i q n e d , but did not d,tt e, the Opt rui jgreement • < .a;.,: 
t -' 'ii ' -i'tiuri a g r e e m e n t in^lu^f •' .% ~ * d a y 
duration and gave Mr. Hansen, and his fi f r\ * mrci pa;" > . L . rut< 
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Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen"), or their assigns, the right to 
purchase the Mascaros' property. 
When Mr. Hansen discovered that defendant and third-party 
plaintiff Leland Mascaro ("Mr.-Mascaro") was the actual owner of 
the property, he asked the Mascaros to sign a second Option 
agreement {Plaintiff's Exhibit 2). The terms of the second Option 
agreement, dated September 14, 1993, were identical to the first 
Option agreement and was signed by both the Mascaros. According to 
the trial testimony, it was also on this date that Mrs. Mascaro 
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West Inc. ("Century 21") 
had an exclusive listing agreement on the property. The Century 21 
listing agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 30) had been signed by Mr. 
Mascaro on May 28, 1993, and provided for a six month duration. 
The Court found Mr. Hansen's testimony that he was not aware of the 
Century 21 agreement was lacking in credibility. To the contrary, 
the Court finds that the Century 21 agreement was disclosed to Mr. 
Hansen and that he requested Mrs. Mascaro to obtain a one-party 
exemption from Mr. Jerard Dinkelman, the principal broker under the 
Century 21 Agreement. Mrs. Mascaro obtained the exemption 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 29) on September 14, 1993. This exemption was 
acquired before the second Option agreement was executed. 
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It further appears from the testimony that when Mr. Ahlin did 
not make an immediate offer, Mr, Hansen engaged in other actions 
with the Mascaros, including having them write a letter 
(Plaintiffs Exhibit 3), dated October 6, 1993, to put pressure on 
Mr. Ahlin to make the deal. Mrs. Mascaro conceded at trial that 
this letter, stating that she and her husband had been contacted by 
another developer offering ernest money on the parcels, was a 
fabrication. 
On October 12, -1993, Mr. Ahlin made an offer on the property 
through a Real Estate Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) of 
the same date. In addition to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
Mr. Hansen prepared a Dual Agency Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) 
which was signed by Mr. Ahlin and Mrs. Hansen. The Court finds 
this Agreement is significant because Mr. Hansen had continuously 
represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. 
In addition, Mr. Rod Gordon testified that he was Mr. Ahlin's agent 
and that it was inappropriate for the Hansens to present a Dual 
Agency Agreement for Mr. Ahlin's consideration and signature. Also 
of significance is the Sales Agency Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 
4) which the Hansens prepared for the Mascaros' signature. A hand-
written notation on the top of this contract expressly states that 
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it is a single party listing and that the single party is Wetcor. 
All of these documents were sent to the Mascaros and to their legal 
counsel, Mr. Mitch Olsen. Mr. Olsen testified that he advised the 
Mascaros not to sign the documents and offered to draft an original 
real estate purchase contract which included a provision for 
commission to be paid to the Hansens in the event that Mr. Ahlin 
consummated the purchase of the property (Plaintiff's Exhibit 16), 
Based on Mr. Olsen's advice, the Mascaros did not act on Mr. 
Ahlin's offer but continued to negotiate with him. In addition, 
the testimony is clear that no listing agreement was ever executed 
or contemplated by the Mascaros at that time. 
On November 14, 1993, Mr. Hansen came to the Mascaros' home 
with a number of documents. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen brought an 
Option Agreement (Defendant's Exhibit 89), a Limited Agency 
Disclosure Agreement (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), a blank Real Estate 
Purchase Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), and four listing 
agreements ("Listing Agreements") with Salt Lake Board of Realtors 
Land Data Input Forms (Plaintiff's Exhibits 17 - 20). In his 
testimony, Mr. Hansen acknowledged that in preparing these 
documents the night before, he had predated many of them. The 
Court finds that Mr. Hansen's preparation of these documents was 
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unsolicited and that Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros on 
a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel. It appears 
to the Court that Mr. Hansen's urgency in preparing these documents 
and having the Mascaros sign them was based on the expiration of 
the second Option agreement. It further appears from the Mascaros' 
testimony that Mr. Hansen's scheme was to have the Mascaros present 
an offer to Mr. Ahlin with the expectation that he would purchase 
a small portion of the acreage and agree to an option on the 
remainder of the land. However, because the Mascaros and Mr. 
Hansen did not yet know how many acres Mr. Ahlin would actually be 
willing to purchase, the principle terms of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract were left blank. In addition, only the first of 
the four Listing Agreements contained an expiration date. 
The Court finds that the first Listing Agreement (Plaintiff's 
Exhibit 17A) , in its unaltered state, reflects the actual agreement 
between the Mascaros and Mr. Hansen. This Listing Agreement was 
set-to expire^on November 15, 1993, one day after Mr. Hansen's 
Sunday meeting with the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen 
altered the date on this Listing Agreement from November 15, 1993 
to November 15, 1994. This finding is based on the credible 
testimony of the Mascaros and the Court's comparison of documents 
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where changes are initialed (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 26), with the 
Listing Agreement marked as Plaintiff's Exhibit 17A, where the 
change in the expiration date has no initials. The Court further 
finds that with respect to the other three Listing Agreements, 
which were blank with respect to the expiration dates, these were 
filled in by Mr. Hansen, subsequent to the Mascaros' signature, 
with "November 14, 1994" dates. The credible testimony established 
that Mr. Hansen's conduct in changing and/or writing in the 
expiration dates, was engaged in without the knowledge and the 
approval of the Mascaros. In addition, the dates alluded to and 
written by Mr. Hansen were contrary to the parties' agreement and 
clear understanding that the Listing Agreements would expire in one 
day. 
This Court also finds that Mr. Ahlin did subsequently sign 
both the Option Agreement and the Real Estate Purchase Contract, 
and Mrs. Hansen accepted an earnest money check for $4,000. 
Further, it is clear that the deal between the Mascaros and Mr. 
Ahlin subsequently failed. After an attempt to arbitrate the 
matter of the earnest money, the title company released the $4,000 
earnest money to Mr. Ahlin's assignees. 
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This Court also finds that around this same time, another 
potential purchaser of the property, Michael Brodsky, President of 
Hamlet Development, began to negotiate with the Mascaros. Mr. 
Brodsky testified that he proposed purchasing the property in 
stages and thought that he and the Mascaros had reached a verbal 
agreement on the sale. , However, before the agreement was 
finalized, Mr. Brodsky was informed by the Mascaros that a sale of 
the property had occurred. In September 1994, the Mascaros 
signed a one year listing agreement with defendant Cannon 
Associates. In October 1994, the Mascaros signed a Real Estate 
Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to defendant 
Tracey Cannon ("Ms. Cannon"). The Mascaros and Ms. Cannon closed 
on this property on May 11, 1995. Ms. Cannon received a commission 
from the sale of $115,338.16. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The Court determines that the listing aorre^ m^ nf-<? entered 
into between Wardley and the Mascaros are voidable 
because they vere secured by fraud in the inducement. 
In its Second Amended Complaint, Wardley claims that the 
Mascaros have breached their Listing Agreements with Wardley by 
refusing to pay Wardley the 7% commission provided for in the 
Listing Agreements upon the sale of the property to Ms. Cannon. 
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Wardley argues that the sale to Ms. Cannon was entered into within 
the one-year term of the Listing Agreements. According to Wardley, 
when the sale on the property to Ms. Cannon closed, the contractual 
requirements for Wardley's earned commission had been satisfied. 
In their Counterclaim and Third Party Complaint against 
Wardley and the Hansens, the Mascaros contend they were induced to 
sign the Listing Agreements in reliance on false representations 
made to them by Mr. Hansen. The representations which the Mascaros 
claim were fraudulent are: (1) that Mr. Hansen told them that he 
would only receive a commission for the sale of the Mascaros' 
property to Wetcor if they signed the Listing Agreements and (2) 
that the Listing Agreements would be valid for only one day and 
would apply only to the Wetcor purchase. The Mascaros also claim 
that Wardley breached its contract with them by failing to list the 
property on the MLS, and by failing to appropriately market the 
property. 
Under Utah law, a person may rely upon positive assertions 
made by another, Duaan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247 (Utah 1980), 
and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured party to avoid 
the contract. Berkely Bank for Cooperatives v. Meibos, 607 P.2d 
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798, 801-04 (Utah 1980). The nine essential elements of fraudulent 
inducement (fraud) are: 
"(1) that a representation was made; (2) 
concerning a presently existing material fact; 
(3) which was false; (4) which the representor 
either (a) knew to be false or (b) made 
recklessly, knowing that he had insufficient 
knowledge upon which to base such 
representation; (5) for the purpose of 
inducing the other party to act upon it; (6) 
that the other party, acting reasonably and in 
ignorance of its falsity; (7) did in fact rely 
upon it; (8) and was thereby induced to act 
(9) to his injury and damage," 
Meibos, 607 P.2d at 800. 
The Court determines that the Mascaros have proven fraudulent 
inducement because they have presented evidence supporting all of 
its elements. This Court finds most significant the fact that 
there are inconsistencies between the written terms of the Listing 
Agreements and the Mascaros' expressed intention to limit Mr. 
Hansen's representation to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and to limit the 
duration of his representation to one day. These inconsistencies 
can only be reconciled with a finding that Mr. Hansen fraudulently 
represented that the Listing Agreements would be limited to one-
party and would expire in one day to induce the Mascaros to sign 
the Listing Agreements. As part of his fraudulent scheme, the 
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Court finds that Mr. Hansen altered the November 15, 1993, date 
which was originally found on the first Listing Agreement and added 
expiration dates to the remaining three Listing Agreements to 
reflect an unagreed and unintended one-year duration. It appears 
Mr. Hansen unilaterally modified the Listing Agreements to 
improperly expand the scope of his representation beyond that 
contemplated by the Mascaros. The Court finds that Mr. Hansen's 
modifications were made without the Mascaros' knowledge and at a 
time when they did not have counsel available on the benefit of 
necessary legal advice. Based on the Mascaros' testimony, which 
the Court found to be credible, they were induced into signing 
incomplete drafts of the Listing Agreements during a Sunday 
meeting, when their legal counsel was apparently unavailable, 
because of Mr. Hansen's representation that it was the only way for 
him to receive a commission on the deal and his assurances that the 
final version of the Listing Agreements would contain the 
limitations they had discussed. In addition, the Mascaros' 
testified that they failed to take any additional precautions such 
as filling out the blank spaces because of their belief that Mr. 
Hansen had their best interests in mind. On this topic, the Court 
found Mrs. Mascaro's statement that "blind trust walked in and care 
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walked out" to be a particularly compelling statement concerning 
the Mascaros' reliance upon Mr. Hansen's representations and the 
opportunity for deception by Mr, Hansen. The Court finds that Mr. 
Hansen took full advantage of this opportunity by arriving for a 
hastily scheduled meeting with the Mascaros, whom Mr. Hansen knew 
to be represented by legal counsel, on a Sunday, when counsel would 
be unlikely to be available. 
Overall, the Court found that the Mascaros' belief that they 
were operating under a one-day, one-party listing agreement was 
corroborated by documents received into evidence and the totality 
of credible trial testimony. For instance, the Sale Agency 
Contract (Plaintiff's Exhibit 4) presented to the Mascaros and 
signed by Mrs. Hansen imparts the Hansens' acknowledgment of the 
Mascaros' expressed intention to limit the Hansens' listing to "a 
single party listing . . . The single party is Wetcor." Further, 
the Court finds that Mr. Hansen was aware of the Century 21 Listing 
and was fully cognizant he could represent the Mascaros only if he 
could obtain a one-party exemption. Mr. Hansen's request that Mrs. 
Mascaro obtain a one-party exemption from Century 21 is congruent 
with the Mascaros' express reservations that their listing 
agreement with the Hansens be limited to the Ahlin/Wetcor deal and 
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with the Hansens' recognition that their representation had to be 
limited to one-party so as not run afoul of the Century 21 Listing. 
Next, it is significant to the Court that the change in the 
expiration date on the first Listing Agreement was not initialed. 
When compared to other documents where changes were initialed by 
the Mascaros, the lack of initials on the altered expiration date 
strongly suggests to the Court that the date was modified after the 
Mascaros signed this Listing Agreement and without their knowledge 
or permission. The Hansens' actions and the trail of documents 
speak loudly and convincingly that the Mascaros signed the Listing 
Agreements only because of Mr. Hansen's fraudulent 
misrepresentations and false assurances concerning the duration and 
scope of these agreements. In reaching this determination, the 
Court has given due consideration to all of the evidence, including 
the Mascaros' confessed lack of expertise in real estate matters 
and the particular facts surrounding Mr. Hansen's insistence that 
they sign the Listing Agreements on a Sunday, when they did not 
have access to their legal counsel. The existence of these proven 
facts in this case defeats Wardley's recovery upon the Listing 
Agreements. This Court concludes it would be inequitable, would be 
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unjust, and unlawful for this Court to enforce agreements, procured 
through fraudulent inducement. 
The Court notes that there are also other possible grounds on 
which the Mascaros could avoid liability under the Listing 
Agreements, including the doctrine of mistake. However, since the 
Court finds that the Listing Agreements are voidable on the grounds 
of fraudulent inducement, the Court deems it unnecessary to 
consider alternative theories. 
To summarize, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim 
that the Mascaros breached the Listing Agreements. Specifically, 
the Court rules that the Listing Agreements are unenforceable. 
Further, the Court rules against Wardley on its claim that Ms. 
Cannon interfered with Wardley's economic relations with respect to 
the Mascaros. Since the Listing Agreements were unenforceable, 
Wardley did not have viable economic relations with the Mascaros, 
with which Ms. Cannon could interfere. 
With respect to the Mascaros' Counterclaim and Third-Party 
Complaint, the Court's ruling that the Listing Agreements are 
unenforceable renders moot the Mascaros' claim that they are 
entitled to attorney's fees and costs as specified within the terms 
of the Listing Agreements. In other words, in disaffirming the 
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terms of the Listing Agreements, the Mascaros cannot seek to 
selectively reinstate only certain portions of the Listing 
Agreements which are favorable to them. The same concept applies 
to the Mascaros' claim that Wardley breached the terms of the 
Listing Agreements. As stated previously, since fraudulent 
inducement has been proven, the terms of the Listing Agreement are 
not enforceable or binding on either the Mascaros or Wardley. In 
so ruling, the Court has essentially placed the Mascaros in the 
same position that they were in before the Listing Agreements were 
executed. 
With respect to the Mascaros' claim for damages on fraud, it 
is this Court's view that the Mascaros have been restored to their 
former position by this Court's determination that the Listing 
Agreements are void. Moreover, while the Mascaros may have 
suffered emotional angst over the Hansens' conduct and whether 
their property would be sold, there is no evidence that this 
distress resulted in any compensatory damages. As a corollary, the 
Mascaros have not presented any evidence that they have suffered a 
pecuniary loss, particularly in light of their sale of the property 
to Ms. Cannon under more beneficial terms than were offered by the 
WARDLEY V. MASCARO PAGE SEVENTEEN MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Ahlin/Wetcor deal- Accordingly, the Court denies the Mascaros' 
claim for damages. 
Counsel for the Mascaros is to prepare an Order and Findings 
consistent with, but not limited to the content of this Ruling 
within fifteen (15) days. 
Dated this J-0 day of August, 1998. 
n 
LESLIE AJ LEWIS 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO, 
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC., ; 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ] 
) ORDER DENYING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 940907000 CN 
) Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro 
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's 
fees from Plaintif&TTiird Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"), 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to 
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
APR 2 1 1939 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Both Cannons and Mascaros claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56 (1) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and asserted in bad 
faith. 
2. Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit." 
3. Even though the listing agreements entered between Wardley and the 
Mascaros were voidable because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing 
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which were not entirely clear. 
There was no evidence presented that Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's 
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that it had a valid 
claim for unpaid commissions. The evidence indicated: (a) Wardley had an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; and (c) Wardley did not intend to or act with knowledge that its 
activities would hinder, delay, and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Cannon and Mascaros failed to demonstrate that Wardley's claims were 
"frivolous," or "of little weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in 
Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983). 
2. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith. 
3. The totality of facts and circumstances would make it inequitable to 
force Wardley to pay Cannons' and Mascaros' attorney's fees. 
DATED this L^l' day of Marchr 1999 





Judge Leslie Lewis 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \3& day of March, 1999, a true and correct copy of 
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MASCARO, TRACY CANNON and 
CANNON ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah 
Corporation, 
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WARDLEY BETTER HOMES AND 
GARDENS, 
Counter Defendants, 
FINAL ORDER OF JUDGMENT 
Case No. 940907000CN 
Honorable Leslie A. Lewis 




RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES 
HANSEN, 
Third-Party Defendants, 
On January 29,1999, the Court entered its Partial Findings of Facts and Conclusions of 
Law and Judgment dismissing Plaintiffs First, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief against the 
Mascaros and Plaintiffs Second and Fourth Claims for Relief against Ms. Cannon. In addition, 
the Court entered a judgment of no cause as to the Mascaros' First, Third and Fourth 
Counterclaims against Wardley and the Hansens, and denied any claims for relief under the 
Mascaros' Second Cause of Action against the Hansens. 
During the trial of this matter which came before the Honorable Leslie A. Lewis on 
June 8, 1998 through June 11, 1998, the Court ruled from the bench, finding no cause for 
Plaintiffs Third and Fifth Claims for Relief. 
After trial, the Mascaros and Cannon filed motions for attorney's fees and costs. 
Wardley opposed the motions for attorney's fees and filed objections to the defendants' claimed 
costs. On April 21, 1999, this Court entered its order denying the Cannons' motion for attorneys 
fees. On October 19, 1999, this Court also denied the Mascaros' motion for attorney's fees. 
2 
JUDGMENT 
! JC )V\ " Tl IERHFORE, in accordance wi th the Cour t ' s ru l ing from the bench during the 
trial on this mat ter , and further in accordance wi th the C n m T s Piiiiial Findings ol"f\ji I ,nnl 
I i m c i u s i o n s ot ! aw. and Judgment dated January 29 , 1999, a conv of wh ich is at tached hereto 
and incorporated her m i , * •
 : • , • :ugiiK.nt: 
1 Dismissing Plaintiffs First, Sixth and Seventh Claims for Relief against the 
Mascaros; 
2. Dismiss ing Pla int i f f s Second and Foi ii th ' Linns I w RHiVI <j»><iin I l.li - i 'aimon; 
3. Dismiss ing M a s c a r o s ' First, Third and Four th Counterc la ims against Ward ley and 
•' ; r (HP^US; 
4 Denying any claims for relief under the Mascaros" Second Cause of \ ction 
against the Hansens; 
5. D i smiss ing P la in t i f f s TIHMI ,HMI fifth < l i m i " I'm Relief, JIUI 
6. Denying Defendants' motions for attorney's fees. 
M IS SO ORDERED. 
i . - -uh i ! _ day of Yrff] , 2000. 
BY THE COURT: 
<L 
Honorable Eeslie A. Lewis 
Third District Court Judge 
27129.0003\HILLC\SLCU06744.2 
James C Haskins (USB #1406) 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES, P. C. 
357 South 200 East, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone- (801) 539-0234 
Facsimile- (801) 539-5210 
Attorneys for Leland J Mascaro and 
Sheri Mascaro 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH 
SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT, DIVISION I 
WARDLE Y BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LELAND J MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO, 
TRACEY CANNON and CANNON 
ASSOCIATES, INC., a Utah Corporation, 
Defendants. 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI MASCARO, 
Counter Claimants, 
v. 
WARDLBY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS 
Counter Defendant. 
PARTIAL FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 940907000CN 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
LELAND J. MASCARO and SHERI MASCARO, : 
Third Party Plaintiffs, : 
v. 
RUTH MARY HANSEN and ARLES HANSEN, 
Third Party Defendants. 
This matter came on for trial before the Honorable Leslie A Lewis on June 8, 1998 
through June 11, 1998. Plaintiff and Counter Defendant Wardley Better Homes and Gardens 
("Wardley") and Third Party Defendants Ruth Mary Hansen ("Mrs. Hansen") and Aries Hansen 
("Mr. Hansen") were represented by attorneys Neil R. Sabin, J. Craig Smith, and Annette 
Sorensen. Defendants, Counter Claimants, and Third Party Plaintiffs Leland J. Mascaro ("Mr. 
Mascaro" or collectively the "Mascaros") and Sheri Mascaro ("Mrs. Mascaro" or collectively the 
"Mascaros") were represented by James C. Haskins and William D. Darden. Defendants Tracy 
Cannon and Cannon Associates, Inc. ("Mrs. Cannon") were represented by Mark 0. Morris and 
David N. Wolf. After considering the testimony of witnesses and the documentary evidence 
presented at the trial and legal authorities cited by the parties, the Court, ruling from the bench, 
found no cause for Wardley's Third and Fifth Claims of Relief. The Partial Findings of Fact, 
Conclusions or Law, and Order for those claims have been previously submitted to the Court. 
With regard to all other Wardley claims, the Mascaro counterclaims, and Third Party claims, the 
Court hereby makes the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law: 
2 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Mr Hansen approached Mrs. Mascaro and asked if she would be interested in 
selling 128 acres of real property to Michael L. Ahlin ("Mr. Ahlin") d/b/a Wetcor. At that 
meeting, Mrs. Mascaro stated that if Mr. Hansen had a specific buyer for the property, she would 
be interested in selling it to that individual or entity. 
2. Until the deal with Wetcor failed, all subsequent discussions between the Mascaros 
and Mr Hansen involved the purchase of the property by Wetcor. 
3. At the initial meeting, Mrs. Mascaro signed an option agreement which gave Mr. 
and Mrs. Hansen a twenty day option to purchase the property. 
4. After he discovered that Mr. Mascaro was the actual owner of the property, Mr. 
Hansen asked the Mascaros to sign a second option agreement, which was dated September 14, 
1998. This second option agreement was good for two months but the remainder of its terms 
were similar to the first option agreement. 
5. Sometime prior to the execution of the second option agreement, Mrs. Mascaro 
informed Mr. Hansen that Century 21 All West, Inc. ("Century 21") had a six month exclusive 
listing agreement on the property which would expire on November 28, 1998. 
6. Mr. Hansen told Wardley about the Century 21 listing Agreement, and Wardley 
asked Mr. Hansen to get a written exemption. 
7. Mr. Hansen then asked Mrs. Mascaro to get a one-party exemption from Century 
3 
21 That written exemption was acquired before the Mascaros signed the second option 
agreement. 
8. During this time period, the Mascaros informed Mr. Hansen the terms of the deal 
for the property must include a Section 1031, Internal Revenue Service Code, tax free exchange. 
9. Mr. Ahlen did not make an immediate offer on the property following the 
execution of the second option agreement, so Mr. Hansen asked Mrs. Mascaro to write a letter 
to him stating that another developer was interested in the property. The purpose of this letter 
was to put pressure on Mr. Ahlin to make a deal. 
10. Mr. Ahlin finally made an offer on the property through a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract which Mr. Hansen had prepared and which was dated October 12, 1993. Also included 
in the packet of documents presented to the Mascaros and their attorney by Mr. Hansen was a 
Sales Agency Contract which had written across the top in Mrs. Hansen's handwriting: "This is a 
single party listing and that single party is Wetcor." 
11. Besides the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Sales Agency Contract, Mr. 
Hansen provided to the Mascaros a Dual Agency Agreement which he had also prepared and 
which had been executed by Mrs. Hansen and Mr. Ahlen. Prior to this time, Mr. Hansen had 
continuously represented to the Mascaros that he was their agent exclusively. At this time, 
another Wardley representative was Mr. Ahlen's agent; therefore, it was improper for Mr. Hansen 
to present and have Mr. Ahlen sign the Dual Agency Agreement. 
4 
Tht Mascaros' attorney advised them m «l i 11,11 IM> M: doamu'nts, and offered to 
draft an origm.. - -Tact which included a provision which would pay Mr. 
*-n a commission should Mr. Allien purchase the property. 
1 1 The Mascaros based upon llii'ii ,if hinry's Kirn did not accept this offer but 
cor itiniiinl 10 if1"" "»'Mi Mr. Ahlin. 
1 1. 'iocause the second option agreement was set to e,\piit,\ (^  1r I Iwisrn requested a 
meeting with the Mascaros at i - • - a Sunday, November 14, \ ;k ^ M*•-
^ / ,nt ^ A jneement. a Limited Agency Disclosure Agreement, a K: 
Real Estate Purchase Contract, and M..I . *;i.;ig .\gieeuu. »""' . """"H S ill I ake Board of Realtors 
T Rud ' ^:a lupin hums. !\'I: 1 Lin.scn prepared these documents the night before this meeting and 
r xiated many of them. 
15 Mr, Hansen 1 . • wei e making the deal in reverse and after 
ti "^  i : • ied the documents, Mi Hansen would present them to Mr, Ahlen with the 
following proposal: Mr A hlen would be given the oppoi tuiuly j 'inpinluMy pm hase a small 
portion of the I ."S IJ» 10 anM ||«« •• '• >H ,»'i option to purchase the remaining land. Because Mr. 
Hansen and the Mascaros did not know how many acres Mr, Ahlin would pui dmsv < 11111 ii.;lu 1I111 
principle terms -f the Rv <n L j t ^ . .. ivei e left blank. 
16. / - .-resented to the Mascaros at this meeting were unsolicited., and 
Mr. Hansen purposely met with the Mascaros, who lacked any expertise • ih fl\tl * •! '" H\'tf -state, 
on a Sunday without the presence of their legal counsel 
17. At no time prior to this meeting had the Mascaros contemplated or asked Mr. 
Hansen to prepare a general listing agreement for the property. 
18. The Mascaros were only willing to sign the Listing Agreements at the meeting 
because Mr. Hansen's represented that he would only received a commission from \Vetcor's 
purchase of the property if those documents were executed. 
19. At this meeting, Mr. Hansen and the Mascaros agreed that the Listing Agreements 
would apply to the Wetcor deal and be valid for one day only. 
20. The Mascaros were also willing to sign blank documents because they believed 
that Mr Hansen was looking out for their best interests. 
21. Based upon Mr. Hansen's representations of the limited applicability of the 
documents and their trust in Mr. Hansen, the Mascaros executed the Real Estate Purchase 
Contract, the Option Agreement, and four of the Listing Agreements although at the meeting only 
one of the Listing Agreements had a written expiration date. That date was November 15, 1993, 
the day after the Sunday meeting. 
22. The expiration date of that Listing Agreement was subsequently changed to 
November 15, 1994, and unlike changes to other documents executed by the 
Mascaros—including the signature date of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the expiration 
date of the Option Agreement presented to the Mascaros at the November 14, 1993 
6 
meeting—that altered date was not initialed by the Mascaros. 
23 After the Sunday meet ing, Mr. H a n s e n a l tered ilic r \ p n a l i u i >filn.j il.iit il I i.simg 
A g r e e m e n t In N , , v r i i i h n |'» 1004 w i t h o u t the M a s c a r o s ' k n o w l e d g e o r permission. 
' 1 f* Ir Hansen also wrote an expiration date o f N o v e m b e r 15 1004 on the other 
three List ing Agreement s aflcr lliry - 1 or 
• ^ mi'v ;jon. 
,^ "
 r; \'fv: signed both the Option Agreement and ..v Roa; * ,tate i\. .^use 
Contra.: a:i.' .i: *- - I inune\ (link In Mis H,insni foi $4,000.00. 
26. The deal between the Mascaros and Mr. .' i-m failed because the terms and the 
conditions of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and the Optioi i - s gi eei i lent coi 1.1ci i: i : 11: e i i let Foi 
in.'J.inrf; Mi "ililni failed In Liu- the property annexed by an incorporated municipality as 
required by one of the addenda to the Real Estate Purchase Contract, nor did he effectuate a 
Sectioi I 1031 of the Ii itei i lal Re c i n te Sei "< - ice Cc tie tax fi ee exel lai ige as i e cp nil ed bj tl le 
a d d e n d u m to the Opt ion Agreement . 
27. Mtn n vague and vain'attempt to arbitrate the issue of the e a rnes t m o n e y , 11 n• i ii Ir 
coi i lpai ly ewii i i i i i iK I H I M M ni iln % i ildi m HI I\III Milm's ass ignees . 
28. After the deal with Mr. Ahlin failed, the Mascaros and Michael Brodsky ("Mr. 
Brodsky") began discussions foi the sa le of the property, hut nm ^ n i ' tn t Jigieenieiil ^ a s f n i n r J 
ii ito by tl ic pai ties. 
7 
29. In September 1994 and while they were in negotiations with Mr. Brodsky, the 
Mascaros signed a one year listing agreement with < 'jinimi A.SMH Mtes, 
|,n,pcfiy(n l n , i \ ('.titnur! in (h Inbci of*that same year. 
. ^ Mascaros and Tracy Cannon closed on the property on May 11 1 09*, and 
Tracy Cannon received a sale!; eommissinii lunn llir I'Vhisn 5. 
31. The Mascaros sold the property to Tracy Cannon under terms better than those 
proposed under the Wetcor deal. 
•- " Jlhuiiyh niKitioiiiilly trauinativ:, Mi I lair^n1'; conduct did not cause the 
Mascaros any compensatory damages or pecuniary loss. 
CONCLUSION: *: 
.i
 !s., *. ,«..,,.,,-;,, iMjujirhiS of Fact, the Court hereby enters the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. I here1 is deaf diiJ i n *hn uii.* i vi li HI t dim llit 1\LI t aios ai.'h*ed In 1 r\y\ tilt il 
(lit-1 Jstinf* Agreements under Mr. Hansen's fraudulent inducement. 
1
 Because the Mascaros were fraudulently induced to enter into the Listing 
"Agreements, Jin ft MM » ol'lln 1 i .(mi}1, Agieenrnf . «in nrilhi i hind nig nor enforceable upon any 
party. 
3. The Mascaros are not entitled to any damages resulting lioin Mi I laiiisnn'\ 
iiiiitdiilnii nrpMMMil.ilmns m ln'li(n'ii>i. 
8 
JUDGMENT 
In accordance with the foregoing partial Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law, this 
Court hereby enters a judgment of no cause as to Plaintiffs First, Sixth, and Seventh Claims for 
Relief against the Mascaros and Plaintiffs Second and Fourth Claims for Relief against Mrs. 
Cannon. Furthermore, the Court hereby enters a judgment of no cause as to the Mascaros' First, 
Third, and Fourth Counterclaims against Wardley and the Hansens, and denies any claims for 
relief under the Mascaros5 Second Cause of Action against the Hansens. 
, \ 
Dated this Jt[ dayof January 1999. 
v 
BY THE 60URT: 
7&W- JMM 
Leslie A. Lewis 
Third District Court Judge 
5-***. 
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Steven B. Smith, #5797 
SCALLEY & READING, P.C. 
Attorneys for Plaintiff Wardley 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 531-7870 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
WARDLEY BETTER HOMES & GARDENS, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
LELAND J. MASCARO, SHERI MASCARO, ] 
TRACEY CANNON and ASSOCIATES, INC., ; 
a Utah corporation, ] 
Defendant. ) 
) ORDER DENYING 
) ATTORNEY'S FEES 
) Civil No. 940907000 CN 
i Judge: Leslie A. Lewis 
Defendants Tracey Cannon and Cannon and Associates ("Cannon") and 
Defendants/Counterclaimants/Third Party Plaintiffs, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro 
("Mascaros"), after a trial in the above matter, petitioned the Court for an award of attorney's 
fees from PlaintifLTThird Party Defendant, Wardley Better Homes and Gardens ("Wardley"), 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-27-56. Memoranda in support and in opposition to 
those Motions were filed and those Motions were submitted for decision. The Court having 
reviewed the Motions, Memoranda, and being fully informed, now makes and enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order: 
APR ? 1 1939 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
?- JS >tfi Caninins and' Mascaras claimed a right to attorney's fees pursuant 
to Section 78-27-56 Q) contending that Wardley's claims were meritless and assented in I nl 
faith. 
2. Wardley's claims, however, were not "without merit." 
3. 6ven though the listing agreeiuan rntnnl between Wardley and the 
Masciijijis wetv v< iilah|t. because of the misconduct of Arlis Hansen, the legality of the listing 
agreements consisted of mixed factual and legal questions which w/ir IMH nidn-l i It JI 
- There was no t-vuictn i prvsnik-il llul Wardley independently knew of Mr. Hansen's 
fraudulent conduct, and there was evidence that Wardley strongly believed that i ., 
claim,,, for unpaid comi^ission. I lu e vidnti. iiidiaifecf I ,i | Wardley had an honest belief in 
ffk propriety of the activities in question; (b) Wardley did not intend to take unconscionable 
advantage of others; a^d (c) Wardley did not intend h. i .i. I Willi knowledge I hat its 
• N'tivihVs wuiid' luiNin
 t dirlav and defraud Cannon or the Mascaros. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
J- i^ oznc:!? m ' Mascaros failed to deznoz2Strate that Ward)ey's claims were 
"frivolous," or "of littl^ weight or importance, having no basis in law or fact" as set forth in 
Cady v. Johnson, < )m 
2. Wardley's Complaint was not asserted or pursued in bad faith. 
3. The totality of facts and circumstari* itable to 




DATED this L.I "day of Marchr 1999. ll>< 
By the Court: / / / 
Judge Leslie Lewis 
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addressed to the following: 
James C. Haskins, Esq. 
HASKINS & ASSOCIATES 
357 South 200 East, #300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Mark O. Morris, Esq. 
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^ywdfr' "T -4fvng 
3 
for attorney's fet 
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12-99 Filed: Mascaros' response to Wardley and Hansen's opposition to 
Mascaros' motion for attorneys fees from third party defendantschells 
19-99 Filed order: Signed court's ruling-Mascaros are not entitled to 
attorney fees, counsel for Hansens is to prepare an order 
consistent with ruling chells 
Judge llewis 
Signed October 19, 1999 
07-00 Filed: Verified bill of costs jaheilm 
•11-00^Filed order: Signed final order of judgment chells 
Judge llewis 
Signed January 11, 2000 
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Before Judges Jackson, Orme, and Thorne, 
JACKSON, Associate Presiding Judge: 
fl Tracy Cannon (Cannon) and Cannon & Associates, Inc., 
(Associates) appeal from the trial courtfs order denying their 
request for attorney fees. We affirm. 
BACKGROUND 
1(2 On November 14, 1993, Leland J. Mascaro and Sheri Mascaro 
(Mascaros) and Wardley Better Homes and Gardens signed four 
listing agreements (listing agreements) through Wardley's agent, 
Aries Hansen (Hansen). The first listing agreement, which was 
set to expire the next day, reflects the actual agreement between 
the Mascaros and Hansen. The expiration dates on the other three 
listing agreements were left blank. Hansen, after obtaining the 
Mascaros1 signatures and without their knowledge or approval, 
altered the expiration date on the first of the four listing 
agreements from November 15, 1993 to November 15, 1994, and 
unilaterally filled in the blank expiration dates on the three 
other listing agreements with the same fraudulent date. In 
September 1994, the Mascaros signed a one-year listing agreement 
with Associates as broker. Later, the Mascaros signed a Real 
Estate Purchase Agreement agreeing to sell the property to 
Cannon. The Mascaros and Associates eventually closed on the 
sale of the property to Cannon in 1995. Cannon received a 
$115,338.16 commission from the sale. 
U3 As a result, Wardley brought an action against the Mascaros 
to recover a real estate commission under its four listing 
agreements. The Mascaros answered Wardley1s complaint and 
counterclaimed against Wardley. Further, they filed a third-
party complaint against Hansen and his wife Ruth, claiming 
negligence, fraud, breach of contract, and seeking a declaratory 
judgment. Wardley filed an amended complaint against Cannon 
asserting unlawful interference with contract, conspiracy, and 
seeking a declaratory judgement. Cannon filed a motion for 
summary judgment, but the trial court denied the motion because 
there were "material facts at issue." Wardley then filed, with 
the permission of the trial court, a second amended complaint 
against Associates for violation of statutes and conversion, in 
addition to all of the claims filed in the first amended 
complaint against Cannon. After four days of "carefully 
evaluating the trial testimony and carefully scrutinizing the 
numerous documents entered into evidence," the trial coxirt ruled 
against Wardley on all claims. The court concluded that, due to 
fraud in the inducement, the listing agreements signed by the 
Mascaros were voidable and unenforceable. The court also 
concluded that Wardley had failed to meet its burdens of proof on 
its claims against Associates. Further, the trial court ruled 
that the Mascaros were unable to recover on any of their 
counterclaims or third-party claims. 
20000128-CA 2 
1)4 Associates, Cannon, and the Mascaros requested attorney fees 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). The 
trial court denied their requests, concluding that Wardley's 
claims were not shown to be "without merit" and not brought in 
"bad faith," as the statute requires. See Utah Code Ann. § 78-
27-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). Cannon and Associates appeal the 
trial court's ruling, arguing that the statutory requirements of 
section 78-27-56 were satisfied via principles of vicarious 
liability, which principles they suppose impute knowledge of 
Hansen's fraudulent actions to Wardley. Appellants contend that 
even if there was no evidence that Wardley knew of Hansen's fraud 
before bringing claims against the Mascaros, Cannon, and 
Associates, principles of vicarious liability should still impute 
to Wardley the knowledge that the listing agreements under which 
Wardley brought suit were obtained by fraud. If such knowledge 
is imputed to Wardley, Appellants reason, then Wardley's suit 
would be without merit and brought in bad faith, thus entitling 
Appellants to attorney fees under section 78-27-56. Appellants 
challenge the trial court's ruling as to attorney fees purely as 
a matter of law, marshaling no evidence to dispute any issue of 
fact. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
15 Section 78-27-56 authorizes the court to award attorney fees 
to a prevailing party "if the court determines that the action or 
defense to the action was [1] without merit and [2] not brought 
or asserted in good faith." Id. An appeal from a ruling that 
attorney fees are unavailable under section 78-27-56 involves two 
standards of review, one for each step of the analysis 
respectively.1 Whether a claim is without merit is a question of 
1. Citing Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998) and 
Robertson v. Gem Ins. Co., 828 P.2d 496 (Utah Ct. App. 1992), 
Appellants assert that we should review the attorney fees issue 
as a legal question, reviewing only for correctness. Appellants 
misstate the standard of review. Where section 78-27-56 is 
invoked as a basis for attorney fees, our decisions specify that 
"the finding of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed 
by this court tinder the 'clearly erroneous1 standard." Jeschke 
v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). "To clarify 
the matter: As to whether the party lacked good faith, the trial 
court must make a factual finding of a party's subjective intent. 
In addition, the trial court must conclude, as a matter of law, 
that the action was without merit." Pennington v. Allstate Ins. 
Co., 973 P.2d 932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998). 
Similarly, Appellants misstate the trial court's findings. 
(continued...) 
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law which the appellate court reviews for correctness, while a 
determination of bad faith is a question of fact and is reviewed 
by the appellate court under a clearly erroneous standard. See 
Jeschke v. Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 203-04 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 
(citations omitted); Pennington v. Allstate Ins. Co., 973 P.2d 
932, 939 n.3 (Utah 1998). 
ANALYSIS 
%6 The trial court did not commit reversible error in ruling 
that Appellants were not entitled to attorney fees under Utah 
Code Ann. § 78-27-56 (1996 and Supp. 1999). The statute permits 
an award of attorney fees "to a prevailing party if the court 
determines that the action or defense to the action was without 
merit and not brought or asserted in good faith," subject to 
exceptions which do not apply here. Utah Code Ann. § 78-27-56(1) 
(1996 and Supp. 1999). Where an action is without merit and is 
not asserted in good faith, the court, in its discretion, may 
deny fees only if it enters in the record the reasons for not 
awarding fees under section 78-27-56(1). See id. § (2). Here, 
as required by the statute, the trial court stated its reasons 
for denying Appellants' request for attorney fees, both in its 
Memorandum Decision and in its Order Denying Attorney Fees. 
I. Challenge Based on Statutory Requirements 
1(7 A finding of bad faith is a factual question. Jeschke v. 
Willis, 811 P.2d 202, 204 (Utah Ct. App. 1991). Thus, to 
challenge a finding of fact, Appellants must marshal the 
evidence, citing the appellate court to all the evidence 
supporting trial court's ruling. Then, Appellants must 
demonstrate why, even when viewed in the light most favorable to 
the trial court, the evidence is insufficient to support the 
challenged finding. See Valcarce v. Fitzgerald, 961 P.2d 3 05, 
1. (...continued) 
They state that "the court found that Wardley, through its agent 
Aries Hansen . . . had altered the dates of certain listing 
agreements." Further, they state in their brief that the "trial 
court found that through its agent, Wardley took full advantage 
of its opportunity to deceive the Mascaros . . . ." While the 
trial court found that Hansen acted in the manner described, 
nowhere in the record is there a finding by the trial court that 
Wardley had either altered listing agreement dates or taken full 
advantage of an opportunity to deceive. 
Lastly, Appellants indicate that Hansen urged Wardley to 
initiate its suit, but provide no citations to the record to 
support that assertion. 
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312 (Utah 1998); West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 
1311, 1313 (Utah App. 1991). Here, Appellants failed to marshal 
the evidence supporting the trial court's finding that Wardley 
did not act in bad faith.2 They explain in their reply brief 
that they purposely decided not to marshal the evidence because 
they accepted the "purely factual findings of the trial court as 
true." Thus, we must "assume [] that the record supports the 
findings of the trial court," including the finding that 
Wardley's suit was not pursued in bad faith. Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991) . Consequently, because a finding 
of bad faith is required before a court can award attorney fees 
under section 78-27-56, our acceptance of this finding as true is 
fatal to this appeal.3 
II. Challenge Based on Vicarious Liability 
%8 Appellants seek to overcome both of the statutory requirements 
by advancing novel theories of vicarious liability. They assert 
that Wardley can be required to pay their attorney fees by 
utilizing vicarious liability in two ways which are unsupported 
by any case law.4 First, they seek to apply vicarious liability, 
2. " [L] ack of good faith . . . for the purposes of [Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-27-56], is synonymous with a finding of 'bad faith.'" 
Jeschke, 811 P.2d at 204 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 617 P.2d 149, 
151-52 (Utah 1983)). 
3. Although the trial court mislabeled its finding as to bad 
faith by inserting it under the heading, "Conclusions of Law," we 
disregard the label and work to the substance. See Gillmor v. 
Write, 850 P.2d 431, 433 (Utah 1993). 
4. Appellants rely solely on their theory of vicarious liability 
for reversal. Because this theory ultimately fails, we need not 
address whether the trial court properly determined if Wardleyfs 
suit was without merit or was pursued in bad faith pursuant to 
section 78-27-56. However, assuming arguendo that we were to 
reach this issue, Appellants1 argument still fails. Whether the 
listing agreements were legal was unclear. On their face, the 
listing agreements seemed legitimate. The trial court was 
required to hear a four-day trial and to weigh a significant 
amount of evidence to determine otherwise. The record does not 
support a finding that Wardley " (i) lacked an honest belief in 
the propriety of the activities in question; (ii) . . . intended 
to take unconscionable advantage of others; or (iii) . . . 
intended to act with the knowledge that [its] activities would 
hinder, delay, or defraud others", as is required for a finding 
of bad faith. (Childs v. Calahan, 1999 UT App 359,1l6, 993 P.2d 
(continued...) 
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a theory ordinarily applied only in tort and in limited 
circumstances to punitive damages, to attorney fees; specifically 
those available under section 78-27-56. Second, they seek to 
apply vicarious liability to make the principal liable for the 
principal's own actions, rather than the actions of the agent. 
Their argument is this: The statutory prongs of a meritless suit 
pursued in bad faith can both be satisfied simply by imputing 
Hansen's knowledge of his own fraud to Wardley. But Appellants 
have cited no legal authority from any jurisdiction in which 
attorney fees have been awarded under their novel theory. Even 
so, Appellants argue that the general vicarious tort liability 
principles set forth in Hodges v. Gibson Prod. Co., 811 P.2d 151 
(Utah 1991) support their assertion. 
H9 In Hodges, the court imputed knowledge of a managerial 
employee, Cosgrove, to his employer and held his employer liable 
for Cosgrovefs intentional malicious prosecution of Hodges. See 
id. at 163. There, Cosgrove had acted within the scope of his 
authority in initiating the prosecution. See id. However, he 
knew but did not reveal the probability that he himself committed 
the crime of which Hodges was accused. See id. at 155. The 
Hodges court invoked Restatement (Second) of Torts as the basis 
for imputing Cosgrove's knowledge to his employer: 
In accordance with and subject to the rules 
stated in this Topic, the liability of a 
principal is affected by the knowledge of an 
agent concerning a matter as to which he acts 
within his power to bind the principal or 
upon which it is his duty to give the 
principal information. 
Id. at 157 (citing Restatement (Second) of Torts § 272). 
However, the court clarified that Cosgrove1s knowledge could be 
imputed to his employer only if Cosgrove acted within the scope 
of his authority5 and was motivated at least in part to carry out 
the employerfs purposes. See id. 
ijio Similarly, the Hodges court cited Restatement (Second) of 
Torts § 253 to apply vicarious liability to initiation of a legal 
action when the agent is authorized to initiate the action. See 
4. (...continued) 
244 (quoting Cady v. Johnson, 671 P.2d 149, 151 (Utah 1983)). 
5. Hansen may have had authority to enter into the listing 
agreements with the Mascaros; however, he did not, under any 
agency theory, have authority to fraudulently change the dates on 
those agreements. 
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id. But the court only addressed the situation where an 
employee, rather than his principal, initiates a tortious legal 
action. See id. Thus, Hodcres stands for the proposition that 
knowledge of an employee can be imputed to his employer when an 
employee tortiously brings a legal action (which is at least 
partially motivated to carry out the employer's purposes) if it 
is within the scope of the employee's authority to bring the 
action. Accordingly, for Appellants to succeed on their claim of 
vicarious liability, based on Hodges, they would have to show 
that Wardley's suit was brought: (1) in tort, (2) by Hansen who 
(3) was acting within the scope of his employment in bringing the 
suit. Appellants have not alleged, nor shown, any of these 
factors. 
Ull Nevertheless, Appellants urge us to stretch the vicarious 
liability principles set forth in Hodges as follows: "[W]here 
the principal filed legal proceedings at the agents's behest, the 
principal has no less liability as the main actor than it would 
have if the agent had instituted such proceedings on behalf of 
the principal." Appellants cite no authority for this 
proposition.6 Instead, they take language from Hodges and remold 
it to fit their theory. That is, they recast the passage, "the 
liability of a principal is affected by the knowledge of an agent 
concerning a matter as to which he acts," id. at 157 (emphasis 
added), to mean Wardley's liability is effected by Hansen's 
knowledge that Hansen acted fraudulently toward the Mascaros. 
What Hodges stands for, however, is that the agent's knowledge of 
an opposing party's innocence, at the time the agent tortiously 
initiates legal proceedings on behalf of his principal, is 
imputed to the principal. In Hodges, Cosgrove, the agent, 
initiated the legal action, whereas here, the agent Hansen did 
not initiate the action. Hansen Appellants rewrite Hodges, 
without citing any authority from any jurisdiction to do so. 
There is no legal support for Appellants' claim that vicarious 
liability should be applied in a manner that imputes the agent's 
6, Appellants, also propose an "unfairness" public policy
 r 
argument to support their position. They argue that unfairness 
arises because their vicarious liability theory runs into a 
legislative roadblock, which limits the ability to file suits for 
real estate commissions to brokers; agents cannot sue. Thus, 
unless vicarious liability is invoked, brokers can escape 
liability for filing a bad faith claim for commissions even 
though encouraged to do so by an agent. This argument does not 
persuade us to apply their novel theory of vicarious liability. 
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knowledge to the principal to answer for the principal's own 
actions.7 
CONCLUSION 
1(12 Appellants' statutory challenge fails because they did not 
marshal the evidence regarding bad faith. Appellants' vicarious 
liability argument is without legal justification. Accordingly, 
we affirm. 
I CONCUR: 
William A. Thorne, Jr . , Judge 
II i i i »:ON</UI' HI niv. RKr.PiiT 
7. Use of vicarious liability as a means of awarding attorney 
fees under section 78-27-56 is a task better suited to the 
legislature than, to this Court, On a purely theoretical 
spectrum, it is possible there is a point at which knowledge may 
be imputed to a principal in a case where the principal initiates 
a suit based upon fraudulent actions of its agent, but we see no 
need to draw that line today 
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